GibburtGeorgia, Russia and the powerless West
I still wonder what drove Saakaschwili to invade South Ossetia. Maybe he gave in to pressure from within the Georgian populace – that means from his voters not his critics – who wanted the reannexion of the rebelling (since 1992!) province. Maybe he felt more secure doing it whilst the Olympic Games are on. Maybe Mr. Bush jr. told him he’d get full American support. It probably was a crude mixture of these and other reasons.
But whatever drove him to invade South Ossetia: he failed. I’m sure Putin and Medvedev opened their finest bottles of champaign when hearing the news that Georgia attacked Tskhinvali. Being superior in the size of their army, in the modernity of their armory and even in local supporters, Russia could nothing but win this conflict. Winning in this case doesn’t mean the Russian annexion of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) but the knockout of a concurring oil-producing country. It’s no wonder that the first reaction of Moscow was the bombing of pipelines, ports and major roads. Modern war is about bombing the enemy back to the Middle Ages within days (as seen in the conflict between Israel and Lebanon in 2006) and it seems that Moscow’s jets succeeded (if not as disastrous as the Israelis did).
This conflict could easily be filed under another demonstration of Russia’s new hegemonía and put away in the drawers if there wasn’t this painful connotation of the powerless, swooning West to it. What Russia learned from this is that whatever military actions they plan, the West won’t accept it but also won’t hazard any consequences. Europe is dependent on Russian oil and gas and it holds no combined military power. The USA have large contingents bound to the Near East, they’re saber-rattling with Iran and won’t stand a chance in an open conventional war with Russia.
Medvedev has – when he reached his goals – signed this contract Europe’s brightest court jester brought him. Medvedev was friendly and the ever dynamic salesman he pretends to be. Sarkozy will take it as an exceptional piece of European diplomacy and will return to France happily. Europe has lost. It is for us to see now what Russia’s going to do with their approved hegemon powers. Whilst it seems that the new Russian state is less willing to expand in size, the worship of old leading figures might lead to a nationalist cult and a growing need for expansion again.
So, with three important global players (USA, Russia, China) around it, Europe must stick together. The nations of Europe can’t survive on their own and though Mr. Sarkozy could only show Europe’s weakness in Moscow he came there as the president of the European Council not as the president of France. Europe, by means of the EU, has to combine its military forces to stand a chance against those superpowers or it will end up as a pawn in the global game of others.
While reading I stumbled about “bombing of pipelines, ports and major roads”, leading me to take the rest of your entry with a pot of salt. If you got that from SPON, please take a look at this article.
Hi Jörn and thanks for your comment. It really is difficult to see through journalistic endeavours on the net. I got my information from tagesschau.de (about the bombing of ports) and heard of pipeline bombing when working yesterday, so I’m gonna be more careful about these issues next time I’m preparing an entry.
Nevertheless, the more important theses at the end remain significant for me, so, you might try taking them without that pot burning your eyes.
I’ve just finished Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine (and will blog about it soon). The observation that Russia has made it its business to bomb oil-infrastructure seems on-the-mark. From The Shock Doctrine, I have picked up that there is no such thing as (competition between) oil producing countries, though. There are only oil producing companies. Some of these companies are (still) national. If Klein’s right, you will see crisis in countries that have large national oil producing companies and you will see these companies privatized. Russia’s Yukos et al. have been reclaimed from oligarchs, but are still very much run as if fully private. By Russia’s seemingly focussed support, you can see the hand of these companies, rather than the power of the state.
Since I had never heard of the struggle in South Ossetia until a few days ago, I do not really have an opinion on one side being “more in the right” than the other. This puts the conclusion that Europe should unite its armed forces, so that it can show off military prowess, a bit out-of-reach for me. There are some good reasons why it definitely should *not* do that, so I will disagree with you, nonetheless.
It seems that true power at the proverbial international table comes more from economics than from a united military. Mind you, when it comes to defense against a direct attack of an EU member, there is more union than you might think. I consider it a strength that there is no singular EU army that can be monolithically deployed in countries that we should not have soldiers in anyway (Iraq, anyone?). You correctly observe the US’ current inability to react, because they are tied up in other matters.
There are two more important problems stemming from the US’ heavy-weight military. Firstly, the national debt is exploding, largely due to the expenses caused by the military (mind the phrasing here; a lot of the money goes to contractors hired by or for the military). Secondly, the immense pressure America can (and does) exert with its saber-rattling has the significant downside of spreading a common aversion against the US and sometimes even blunt hatred. George W. seems to truly believe it’s because people “hate freedom” – this still cracks me up, every time I hear it. I think the “do what we want or we’ll bomb your asses and – worse still – forcibly reconstruct your country to serve our needs” attitude is a bigger factor.
Military high-command is not known for its nuance and debate-orientation. This seems to be a cultural invariant. A fragmented armed forces of Europe seems less prone to rash action. Admittedly, it makes it very prone to inaction, which may at times be frustrating. I do not believe, however, it endangers the survival of Europe or significantly lessens Europe’s power on the international stage in the long run.